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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant# : 
v. : Case No. 970275-CA 
JAMES REDD and JEANNE REDD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendants/Appellees• : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The defendants were charged in the Seventh Judicial District 
in and for San Juan County, with one count of abuse of a dead human 
body, in violation of Utah Code 76-9-704 and one count of 
misdemeanor trespass on trust land. A preliminary hearing was held 
on March 20, 1997. The Trial Court, having heard the testimony, 
argument, and considered the motion, refused to bind over the 
felony. The Court issued a written order dated April 1, 1997, from 
which the State appeals. Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code 
Ann. 77-18a-l(2) (a) 1985 and 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 1996. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The primary legal issue in this appeal is whether the Trial 
Court committed reversible error in its written Findings and Order, 
included in the State's Brief as Addendum B, when the Court found 
that the statute prohibiting certain conduct involving a "dead 
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human body" did not apply to "remains," in this case, small pieces 
of scattered, unidentified bone fragments• This portion of the 
ruling is a statute interpretation, a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 
(Utah 1993) . 
Because the State argues reversible error in the failure to 
bind over for trial, an ancillary issue is the standard of review 
of the Trial Court's factual findings. Rule 52 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that "Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witness." Rule 26(7) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and case law, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah, 1987), make 
U.R.C.P. 52 apply to criminal cases. Thus clearly erroneous in the 
standard for review of the written Court Order findings of fact. 
Ancillary, also, is the effect of oral statements by the 
Court, prior to its written ruling. Contrary to the attempts of 
the State to use comments by the Court outside the written order, 
"oral statements of opinion by the Trial Court, inconsistent with 
the findings do not affect the final judgment." McCollum v. 
Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952). "Oral statements 
and observations of the Trial Court in discussing the evidence do 
not bind him, nor do they limit his prerogative of finally making 
up his mind and such statements and observations are superseded by 
the final written findings and judgment." Newton v. State Road 
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Comm., 23 Utah 2d 350, 353, 463 P.2d 565, 566 (1970). All 
"incidents, impressions, or statements made by the Court prior to 
that judgment are precluded." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1978). 
Thus, for purposes of appeal, the Trial Court's written Order 
stands, only to be tested by a clearly erroneous standard. For 
purposes of appeal, there is only a finding that the State did not 
show "that the bones were in their original place of repose before 
they were disturbed by defendants" (Findings and Order, Addendum 
B, Appellants Brief). This finding of no disinterment is firmly 
planted on the credibility of State witness, Officer Naranjo, who 
testified that the bone material, found the day after the meeting 
with defendants, "was spread around." (R.80). Officer Naranjo 
agreed that the "spread around" description is "the same kind of 
spread around as the thing that you see throughout San Juan County, 
that when you see areas, you see bone fragments occasionally." 
(R.80) 
Thus, there is no review, no review standard, and no 
permissible inclusions in the appeal, for oral Court statements 
made prior to written Findings and Orders. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The statute interpreted is Utah Code Ann. 76-9-704 (1995). 
It is provided in its entirety in the State's Addendum A to its 
opening brief; however, the words in question are found in 76-9-
704(1)(a) and (b). 
A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of 
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a dead human body if the person intentionally 
and unlawfully: 
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report the 
finding of a dead body to a local law 
enforcement agency, or destroys a dead 
body or any part of it; 
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise interred 
dead body, without authority of a Court 
order• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellees concur with the Appellant's statement of the 
case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellees concur, generally, with the State's quoted 
facts; however, the following, omitted by the State, must be 
included. 
Officer Naranjo, the State's first witness, testified that the 
bone material in question was not discovered until the day after 
the meeting of defendants and law enforcement. (R.80). According 
to Officer Naranjo, the bone material "was spread around." The 
"spread around" description is "the same kind of spread around as 
the thing that you see throughout San Juan County, that when you 
see areas, you see bone fragments occasionally." (R.80). 
Further, Mr. Davidson, who is quoted in the State's Statement 
of Facts as having "found 13-15 boxes, 'generally within very close 
proximity'...." (State's Brief, page 5), also testified that "we 
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found them at several different locations...." (R.103). Further, 
he agreed that he "picked up several things that you think may or 
may not be human, you have some bones that you're sure about/ some 
that you're not so sure about." (R.103). The three locations he 
found them were "seven or eight feet from one location to the 
other" (R.104) and the bone fragments were "sort of disposed of in 
kind of a random matter--manner/ I'd say." (R.104). 
The Court made oral statements and then, on April 1# 1997 # 
issued written Findings and Order (Addendum B to State's Brief). 
The written Order did not find probable cause to believe 
disinterment/ rather the written Order was specific in stating "The 
state has not shown that the bones were in their original place of 
repose before they were disturbed by defendants" (emphasis added) 
(Findings and Order, Addendum B of State's Brief/ paragraph 2). 
The State's inclusion of the Court's oral statements in its 
Statement of Issue on Appeal/ in its Summary of Argument, in its 
Argument/ Point One, immediately prior to its conclusion, and in 
its Statement of Facts, is of no consequence to this appeal because 
all "incidents, impressions, or statements made by the Court prior 
to that judgment are precluded." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah, 1978) . Further "oral statements of opinion by the trial 
court inconsistent with the findings do not affect the final 
judgment." McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311,241 P.2d 468, 472 
(1952). "Oral statements and observations of the trial court in 
discussing the evidence do not bind him, nor do they limit his 
prerogative of finally making up his mind and such statements and 
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observations are superseded by the formal written findings and 
judgment." Newton v. State Road Comm.f 23 Utah 2d 350/ 353, 463 
P.2d 565, 566 (1970)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The primary legal issue in this appeal is whether the Trial 
Court committed error in its written Findings and Order, included 
in the State's Brief as Addendum B, when it found that the felony 
charge prohibiting certain conduct involving a "dead human body" 
did not apply to "remains," in this case, small pieces of 
unidentified bone. 
There is a paucity of Utah law defining "dead body" and none 
interpreting "dead human body" as that term is used in Utah Code 
Ann. 76-9-704 (1) (a) . The statute itself does not, internally, 
define this term. However, the annotation and collateral 
references appearing within the statute refer us to Corpus Juris 
Secundum 25A, C.J.S. Dead Bodies, Section 10. 25A C.J.S. Dead 
Bodies, Section 1, at p. 488, specifically defines dead body as: 
the body of a human being deprived of life, it 
signifies a corporeal or tangible entity, and 
does not include remains long since decomposed 
(emphasis added). 
C.J.S. then footnotes three long standing cases in support of 
the exclusion of long decomposed remains from the definition of 
dead bodies. Those cases are Meade v. Dougherty County, 25 S.E. 
915, 98 Ga. 697, 700 (Ga. 1896), Carter v. Zanesville, 52 N.E. 126, 
59 Ohio St., 170, 174 (Ohio 1898), and State v. Glass, 273 N.E. Id 
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893, 896, 27 Ohio App. 2d 214 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) 52 ALR 3d, 691. 
The State's Brief, containing reference to twenty-three cases, 
is void of even one case that defines "dead bodies" to include 
"remains," in this case, a collection of small bones that form no 
identifiable entity; nor is there even a suggestion in the State's 
argument or in the facts that the bone fragments all came from the 
same source. 
The State argues, outside the record, that the Trial Court's 
failure to include disparate bone remains under the felony 
definition for "dead human body," is a racist act. In addition to 
the shocking nature of this outside-the-record red herring, the 
untenable nature of the State's position is also so obvious as to 
be without any case, rule, or statutory support. To the 
contrary, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 1997 case 
arising out of Utah, U.S. v. Shumway, 112 F.3rd 1413, when faced 
with whether an initially relatively complete skeleton of an 
Anasazi infant of great antiquity qualified as a "vulnerable 
victim" for purposes of sentence enhancement, addressed the 
extrapolation from bones to remains. The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Judge Brorby, writing, at p. 1423, illustrates the 
absurdity of such an application, extrapolation and interpretation, 
by considering "a pile of cremated remains, or a pile of dirt that 
was once a pile of bones, if skeletal remains are 'vulnerable 
victims,' certainly, then, these types of remains also should 
qualify." To paraphrase the Circuit applying facts of the instant 
case, if disparate small bones rise to the level of "dead human 
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body," then so must those same bones, cremated, or reduced to a 
pile of dirt. The lack of logic of such an interpretation is 
patent. 
The Tenth Circuit Judge hastens to say, as does everyone, that 
the Court "in no way intend to diminish the cultural importance of 
those sites nor the importance of a commitment to the preservation 
of those sites." Shumwav, supra, p. 1423, footnote 4. "Grave 
robbing, especially grave robbery of the sacred objects of Native 
Americans, is undoubtedly detestable conduct worthy of severe 
castigation; however, such castigation cannot come at the expense 
of reason and common sense." Shumwav, supra, p. 1423, footnote 4. 
It is that reason and common sense that the Trial Court in the 
instant case exercised in its written Findings and Order, when it 
found that the State's position "would extend Section 76-9-704 to 
all private lands in Utah, contrary to legislative intent, and make 
it a felony for private persons to disturb one-thousand year-old 
remains on their own lands." (Written Order, paragraph 8, Addendum 
B of Appellant's Brief). 
The Statefs position, unsupported by authority or reason and 
common sense, would make criminals out of the bean farmer who 
unearths bone fragments and fails to report them to the local law 
enforcement, the family on a picnic, the casual hiker, or a citizen 
strolling home from church who sees bone fragments and fails to 
report the finding to local law enforcement, because there is a 
misdemeanor aspect to this very same statute, which the Trial Court 
found inapplicable to bone fragments. U.C.A. 76-9-704(1) (a) makes 
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it a crime, a misdemeanor, if one "intentionally and unlawfully 
fails to report the finding of a dead body to a local law 
enforcement agency, or destroys a dead body or any part of it." 
To adopt the State's reasoning that the stage of decomposition has 
no bearing on this matter is to walk into the absurd position 
highlighted by the Tenth Circuit - if a skeleton qualifies, then 
so must a pile of bones, a pile of bones cremated, and a pile of 
dirt that was once a pile of bones. 
The State is also inaccurate in its position that the statute 
is ambiguous in its meaning, opening the door to seeking guidance 
from the legislative history and relevant policy consideration. 
When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held 
to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction. 
Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Hornak, 917 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah App. 
1996) . 
The State seeks to include bone fragments in the definition 
of dead human body. To demonstrate the lack of logic of this 
approach, as well as the clear and unambiguous meaning of "dead 
human body, " one only has to reread the statute and substitute 
"bone fragments" for the words "dead body." The following are 
highlights of the statute read as urged by the State: 
1. A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of 
a dead human body if the person intentionally 
and unlawfully: 
a) removes, conceals, fails to report 
the finding of bone fragments to a 
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local law enforcement agency or 
destroys bone fragments or any part 
of it; 
b) disinters a buried or otherwise 
interred bone fragment, without 
authority of a Court order; 
c) dismembers a bone fragment to any 
extent, or damages or detaches any 
port or portion of a bone fragment; or 
d) commits/ or attempts to commit upon 
any bone fragment sexual penetration 
or intercourse, object rape, sodomy, 
or object sodomy ... 
The plain language of this statute shows the legislative 
intent - it is to protect, under the common usage, a dead human 
body. 
Contrary to the position and argument of the State, the order 
subject to appeal, which, by law, supersedes any bench comments or 
findings, and which controls the appeal, shows no finding of 
probable cause of disinterred human remains. Utah law is clear on 
this point. Statements made by a trial judge are not the judgment 
of the case and it is only the signed judgment that prevails. 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978). "Oral statements 
and observations of the trial court in discussing the evidence do 
not bind him, nor do they limit his prerogative of finally making 
up his mind and such statements and observations are superseded by 
10 
the formal written findings of judgment." Newton v. State Road 
Comm., 23 Utah 2d 350, 353, 463 P.2d 565, 566 (1970). "Oral 
statements of opinion by the trial court inconsistent with the 
findings do not affect the final judgment." McCollum v. Clothier, 
121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952). The order is clear - in 
paragraph 2 - "the state has not shown that the bones were in their 
original place of repose before they were disturbed by defendants." 
(Findings and Order, p. 1, paragraph 2, Addendum B of Appellant's 
Brief, emphasis added.) Despite this clear ruling, the State 
argues, incorrectly, in its Statement of Issue on Appeal, in its 
Summary of Argument, in its Argument, Point One, and immediately 
prior to its conclusion, that the Court found probable cause to 
bel ieve the defendants disinterred human remains. Utah law 
prohibits such reliance. 
Thus, the State's argument is void of legal support, is based 
upon impermissible reliance upon oral statements by the Court, 
superseded by written order, is illogical in its application, 
contradicts the logic of the Tenth Circuit, defies reason and 
common sense, and, in its inflammatory position, is outside the 
record. The Trial Court is well grounded, reasoned, and proper in 
its ruling. The Trial Court, contrary to the ill-founded State 
attempt to label, was not racist in its ruling. 





THE TERM "DEAD HUMAN BODY," AS USED IN SECTION 76-9-704, 
DOES NOT INCLUDE A RANDOM COLLECTION OF SMALL BONE FRAGMENTS, 
Utah Code Annotated 76-9-704(1) makes it a crime to fail to 
report to local law enforcement the finding of a dead human body. 
That crime is a misdemeanor. The same statute makes it a felony 
to disinter, destroy, dismember, damage, detach, or sexually 
assault a dead body. The trial court found that a prehistoric 
random collection of small bones and bone fragments did not rise 
to the level of the definition of dead human body, as used in this 
statute. 
The Court interprets a statutory term "according to its 
usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term 
results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of 
the statute." B. L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 934 P. 2d 
1164 (Utah App. 1997), citing Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. 
of Utah State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991). 
One must "look first to the plain language of the statute to 
discern the legislative intent .... Only when we find ambiguity 
in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the 
legislative history and relevant policy considerations." City of 
South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954 (Utah 1996), 
quoting Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah 1996), which 
quoted World Peace Movement of Amer., v Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 
12 
P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). 
The Courts "have nothing to do with what the law ought to be." 
Hanchett v. Burbridcre, 59 Utah 127, 135, 202 P. 377, 380 (1921). 
The Courts "must be guided by the law as it is .... when language 
is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction." Kearns-Tribune 
Corporation v. Hornak, 917 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah App. 1996), quoting 
Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 
P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1979). 
"Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted 
to contradict its plain meaning." Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy 
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890-P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1997), quoting 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). 
When reviewing a statute, we "assume { } that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable." Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, supra, quoting 
Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 690 
(Utah 1991) . 
There is no Utah case defining "dead human body" for purposes 
of Utah Code Ann. 76-9-704. The appellees urge there need not be, 
for it has a common meaning. The statute, internally, does not so 
define that collection of words. However, the annotation and 
collateral references of this statute refers us to Corpus Juris 
Secundum 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies, Section 10. 25A C.J.S. Dead 
Bodies, Section 1, at p. 488, specifically defines dead body as 
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"the body of a human being deprived of life; it signifies a 
corporeal or tangible entity, and does not include remains long 
since decomposed," (emphasis added). C.J.S. then footnotes two 
ancient cases in support of the lack of inclusion of long 
decomposed remains, Meade v. Dougherty County, 25 S.E. 915, 98 Ga. 
697, 700 (Ga. 1896) and Carter v. Zanesville, 52 N.E. 126, 59 Ohio 
St., 170, 174 (Ohio 1898) and one a bit more modern, State v. 
Glass, 273 N.E. 2d 893, 896, 27 Ohio App. 2d 214 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1971) 52 A.L..R. 3d 691. 
The State cites no case in this century, or the last, in this 
state or other, that defines "dead body" to include long decomposed 
remains or bone fragments. 
A statutory historical search supports the clear unambiguous 
meaning of "dead human body" in this statute to refer to body, not 
bone fragments. The predecessor of 76-9-704 is the 1953 76-10-1 
"Disinterring dead bodys". By 1978, 76-10-1 evolved into 76-9-
704 "Abuse of a corpse". The 1988 amendment evolved the title into 
"Abuse or desecration of a dead human body". 
The consistent key is the concept of body, of corpse - a 
recognizable entity. Webster's Ninth New International Dictionary 
and Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 24th edition, approach "body" 
from a common sense, every day meaning. The primary definition of 
body in Webster is, "The organized physical existence or an animal 
or plant either living or dead: as 1) the material part or nature 
of a human being..." and Stedman1s defines "body" as "the total 
organized physical substance of an animal or plant." 
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Rule 4 (h) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
that the charging "words and phrases used are to be construed 
according to the usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined 
by law or have acquired a legal meaning." Nowhere in the State's 
brief is there any cited authority that "dead body#" as it relates 
to this statute# has acquired a different legal meaning or is 
defined by law. Rather, the State's entire approach and cases 
support the common meaning of body - an entity, as does a simple 
reading of this statute. 
Contrary to the State's position, the term "dead human body," 
as used in Section 76-9-704, does not and cannot extend to include 
a random collection of small bone fragments. 
Point Two 
UTAH CODE 76-9-704 IS INTERNALLY CONSISTENT IN ITS PREMISE 
THAT "DEAD BODY" RELATES TO AN ENTITY 
OTHER THAN LONG DECOMPOSED REMAINS, 
This statute in question prohibits a number of activities, all 
relating to a body, not bone fragments. 76-9-704(1) (c) relates to 
dismembering and 1(d) relates to sexual assault on a dead body. 
The mere substitution of the State's position - body equals bone 
fragments - shows the inconsistency of their position and internal 
consistency of the statute. Does it make sense to sexually assault 
bone fragments? Does it make sense to criminalize the seeing and 
not reporting to local authorities, the sighting of bone fragments? 
The exemptions contained within the statute show internal 
consistency that body is the common meaning of "body." The statute 
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exempts from liability the actions relating to funeral parlors (who 
deal in bodies, not bone fragments), anatomical gifts (bodies, not 
bone fragments), the medical examiner (bodies, not bone fragments), 
giving abandoned bodies, not bone fragments, to medical schools, 
and the use of bodies, not bone fragments, for research. 
Seized upon by the State is the fact that 76-9-704 exempts 
from application, the lawful actions of anyone under U.C.A. 9-8-
301 et. seq. - Antiquities. This Act relates to the preservation 
and protection of the State's archaeological and anthropological 
resources, largely on school and institutional trust and grant 
lands. Nowhere, as the State admits, does the Antiquities Act 
define "dead body." Rather, the State reasons, syllogistically, 
that since the Antiquities Act does not apply to "dead human body" 
but rather to a host of things, including archaeological or 
anthropological remains, there was an unnecessary exclusion, 
rendering "the state's Antiquities Act exception mere surplusage." 
The State attempts to improperly leverage the Antiquities Act, with 
which the defendants are not charged, into assisting their 
argument. The simple fact is the coverage of the Antiquities Act 
is wider than the far more limited "dead human body," contained in 
the specific statute at issue. The exclusion includes those 
proceeding under the Act as it may relate to bodies. This is 
logical and not a twist that invalidates the common sense, well 
supported concept of the "dead body." 
The State then flows into an examination of U.C.A. 9-9-401 et. 
seq., the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act, 
16 
again, with which the defendants are not charged. This Act deals 
specifically with the ownership or control of Native American 
remains from State lands and there is no case law or statute cited 
by the State, nor in existence# which supports the argument that 
the remains in the Native American Grave Protection and 
Repatriation Act relate to the definition of dead body in 76-9-
704. Again, "remains" is an illogical substitution in 76-9-704. 
This statute is internally consistent in its premise that 
"dead body" relates to an entity other than long decomposed 
remains. 
Point Three 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF DEAD HUMAN BODY IS NEITHER 
RACIST NOR UNWORKABLE, AND VIOLATES NO PUBLIC POLICY, 
The State cites World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency 
Corp. , 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994), for the proposition that 
"relevant policy considerations" also help guide statutory-
interpretation. Germanely, this case holds that when faced with 
a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain 
language of the statute. Only when we find ambiguity in the 
statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative 
history and relevant policy consideration. World Peace Movement, 
id. Unlike World Peace Movement, id., the State fails to search 
out the legislative history, involving floor debates and the like 
in the instant case. Unlike World Peace Movement, id., and its 
concerned Act, U.C.A. 13-7-1, which sets forth the public policy 
of this state involving that Act, the State, in the instant case, 
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cites no reported public policy. Rather, the State tries to incite 
the Court by unfairly and with no foundation, playing the "racism" 
card. Utah Code Ann. 76-9-704 is color and race blind, as is the 
opinion of the Trial Court. This issue, introduced for the first 
time on appeal, is a red herring, designed to lure the emotional 
and unknowledgeable from the path of very clear legal analysis and 
conclusion. 
There is no hint that the bone fragments in the instant case 
were ever buried. Speculations, which are the meat of this State 
maneuver, can equally include death alone, animal scattering, a 
battle with unburied dead, multiple individuals, and more. The 
State forgets that the written, controlling, factual finding by 
the Trial Court is no evidence of removal from original place of 
repose was presented by the State. 
Tellingly, the State cites no authority, of any sort, for this 
unsupported, outside-the-record attempt to inflame. 
In closing this argument, the State, again, forgets Utah law 
and the Court written findings, when the State asserts "... it was 
their intentional and unlawful disinterring of the dead." This 
differs dramatically from the Court's Findings and Order, that "the 
state has not shown that the bones were in their original place of 
repose before they were disturbed by defendants." (Addendum B of 
Appellant's Brief, page 1, paragraph 2, emphasis added.) 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides, in 
pertinent part, that "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
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erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." Rule 26(7) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and case law, State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah, 1987), make U.R.C.P. 52 apply to 
criminal cases. As is set forth in the Statement of Facts, Officer 
Naranjo testified that the positions of the bone fragments, when 
found, were "spread around" (R.80), and agreed that "spread around" 
as he used it, was "the same kind of spread around as the thing 
that you see throughout San Juan County, that when you see areas, 
you see bone fragments occasionally." (R.80). Mr. Davidson, also 
a State witness, found their placement to be "sort of disposed of 
in kind of a random matter--manner, I'd say." (R.104). 
The oral statements, relied upon incorrectly by the State, 
are, at best, "opinion by the trial court inconsistent with the 
(and) findings do not affect the final judgment." McCollum v. 
Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952). "Oral statements 
and observations of the trial court in discussing the evidence do 
not bind him, nor do they limit his prerogative of finally making 
up his mind and such statements and observations are superseded by 
the formal written findings and judgment." Newton v. State Road 
Comm., 23 Utah 2d 350, 353, 463 P.2d 565, 566 (1970). All 
"incidents, impressions, or statements made by the Court prior to 
that judgment are precluded." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1978). 
In summary, the State cites no clearly defined public policy, 
contrary to its cited authority which contains the applicable 
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public policy within the statute. More importantly, this statute, 
76-9-704, is both color and race blind, as is the Court's Findings 
and Order. These orders, again, found at Addendum B of the State's 
Brief, control the appeal and the oral statements relied upon the 
State are superseded by the written order. The State's ill-played 
race card is outside the record, and has no foundation in law or 
fact. The Order violates no public policy. The State's argument 
is specious and can only act to unfairly denigrate an excellent 
jurist and erode the position of the Trial Court in the eyes of the 
uninformed public. 
Point Four 
SECTION 76-9-704 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT FACTS 
AND THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS RULING, 
The State's final argument is a factual argument, heaping 
conjecture upon innuendo, "fair implication" upon "fair inference," 
followed by a mis-reliance upon the oral statements of the Court, 
prior to its written order. 
As previously pointed out in the preceding section, Utah law 
is that: 
a) the Trial Court's findings, absent abuse 
and clear error, stand; 
b) all impressions or statements made by the 
Court prior to the judgment are precluded. 
State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885 (Utah 1978) 
The Findings and Order are clear and, contrary to the State's 
repeated error, there was no written finding of probable cause that 
20 
the defendants disinterred human remains• The Court's findings, 
supported by the record, are that the State did not show that the 
bones were in their original place of repose before they were 
disturbed by defendants. 
The primary legal issue in the appeal is whether the Trial 
Court committed error in its written Findings and Order, when it 
found that the felony charge prohibiting certain conduct involving 
a "dead human body" did not apply to bone fragments. 
Viewing the facts in the best light for the State, these 
remains are simply bone fragments, unidentified and unidentifiable 
as a dead human body. The written factual finding is disturbed, 
not disinterred, and disturbed does not violate the statute. More 
importantly, as has been exhaustively argued, supported by law, 
statutory interpretation cannot be used to rewrite the law, to 
create a meaning that does not exist, to sacrifice reason and 
common sense on the altar of emotion. 
Section 76-9-704 is not applicable to random unidentified 
disinterred bone fragments. 
This Trial Court, with the same wisdom of the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, refused to torture, twist, or turn a common 
meaning into an illogical result. It simply rejected an 
interpretation of a criminal statute that would criminalize the 
conduct of a large number of the citizens of Utah. Who, in 
exploring to any depth, the phenomenal natural wonders of Utah, 
has not seen pottery shards and bone fragments - and who has 
reported those sightings to local law enforcement? Can every 
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farmer, who works to feed us, be a criminal when he fails to report 
the finding of bone fragments? Is a judge who simply follows the 
law and sees the illogical result of an illogical State position, 
properly branded a racist? 
It is a sad state of affairs when the State can present not 
one case that supports their position as to their desired 
definition of "dead human body," yet argue for thirty-one pages 
that bone fragments, decomposed, unidentifiable remains, are the 
same as a "dead body," that contrary to the written findings, there 
was probable cause as to disinterment, that a simple act of common 
sense was racist, all the while ignoring the fact that their 
position criminalizes thousands of innocent citizens. The State 
builds their foundation on sand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the Trial Court's written Findings and 
Order must not be found to be an abuse of discretion or clear 
error. The written order stands. There is no reasonable 
substitution of "bone fragments" for "dead body." The statute, 
Findings and Order, and rationale of the Trial Court, are all color 
and race blind. It is a matter of law and common sense. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /£^4 day of \yy£~J~\ , 1997. 
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